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Apophasis and Psychoanalysis 
David Henderson 
 The debate about the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge has been a perennial theme in 
psychoanalytic writing. This includes discussions about the scientific status of psychoanalysis, 
the aims of analysis, the nature of interpretation, the relationship between fantasy and reality, and 
so on. The ‘talking cure’ places a premium on insight and putting things into words. “Where id 
was there ego shall be,” said Freud (2001). A strong implication is that where ignorance was 
there knowledge shall be. This chapter focuses however not on psychoanalytic knowledge, but 
on psychoanalytic ignorance and the disciplined learned ignorance of the analyst, in Jung's depth 
psychology.  
 In the realm of practice, if not always in that of theory, psychotherapists are very 
preoccupied with not knowing. While it is not officially in the prospectus, an important element 
of any training in psychoanalytic psychotherapy is developing the capacity to bear long stretches 
of time when you do not know and cannot know what is happening in the session or in the 
analysis.  
 Grinburg (1969) observed that, "In spite of its tremendous impact on mankind, 
paradoxically enough, it has not yet been possible to place and classify psychoanalysis within 
any of the existing fields of knowledge"(517). Wilfred Bion (1988) argued that the focus of the 
psychoanalyst must be on "the unknown and unknowable" (27). Ricoeur (1970) associated 
psychoanalysis with the hermeneutics of suspicion. Karlson (2000) speculated that: 
One of the reasons that psychoanalysis as a science struggles with difficult 
epistemological problems is that its subject matter – the unconscious – is constituted in 
terms of negativity. What other science investigates something which is defined by the 
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prefix un-?! The only resembling discipline, in this sense, may be the so-called “negative 
theology,” which claims that an understanding of God can only be reached by stating 
what God is not. (4) 
 
These views contribute to an appreciation of the problematic of unknowing in psychoanalysis, 
pointing toward the conclusion that psychoanalysis is a contemporary site for apophasis.  
 Sells (1994) translates apophasis as ‘unsaying.’ He distinguishes between apophatic 
theory and apophatic discourse.  Apophatic theory "affirms the ultimate ineffability of the 
transcendent" (3). Apophatic discourse consists of "writings in which unnameability is not only 
asserted but performed" (3). This echoes the distinction often employed in psychotherapy 
between psychic content and psychic process. Psychoanalysis is both a theory and a 
performance.  
 The varieties of apophasis have been classified in a number of ways. Milem (2007) 
identifies four types of apophasis under the headings: metaphysical, desire, experience, and 
renunciation. Rorem (2008) writes about progressive apophatic, complete apophatic, and 
incarnational apophatic. McGinn (2009) claims that apophasis can be subjective or objective – 
there being three varieties of relative subjective apophasis. Franke (2007) speaks of the silent 
matrix of the unmanifest and inexpressible. 
 Pseudo-Dionysius (hereafter Dionysius) uses a range of concepts that carry what Sells’ 
calls apophatic intensity, including:  apophasis (unsaying, denial, negation), aphaeresis 
(abstraction), hoion (as it were, so to speak), hyper (above, beyond, super), exaireou (to be 
removed from, transcend), epekeina (transcendent, beyond), exaiphnes (sudden, suddenly), 
ekstasis (ecstasy, ecstatic), apeiron (infinite, unlimited), agnousia ( unknowing, unknowable, 
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undetectable), henousis (unity, union) and theousis (deification, divinization). The point is that 
there simply is no such thing as the apophatic. Apophasis is not one but many – opening the door 
to many interpretive possibilities.  
Psychoanalytic theory and practice are saturated with apophatic manoeuvres. The 
intuition of apophasis at work in each of the traditions of psychoanalysis (Freudian, Jungian, 
Kleinian, Lacanian, Existential, etc.) accounts for their family resemblance. We recognise the 
clinical style and theoretical formulations of the disparate schools of analysis as analysis 
precisely because of the apophatic element. This chapter uses Cusa’s (1997) concept of the 
coincidence of opposites, Deleuze’s (1987) theories of the Body Without Organs and becoming, 
and Derrida’s (1992) notion of space to illuminate distinct features of apophasis in the work of 
C.G. Jung. 
Coincidence of Opposites 
 The coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum) is one of the fundamental 
organising principles in Jung’s thought. Key concepts such as the self, the god image, the 
collective unconscious, wholeness, and synchronicity are instances of the coincidence of 
opposites. In 1931, in his first use of the term, Jung (1981a) describes the practice of psychology 
as a kind of performance of the coincidence of opposites: "The modern psychologist occupies 
neither the one position nor the other, but finds himself between the two, dangerously committed 
to 'this as well as that'… it is no longer possible for the modern psychologist to take his stand 
exclusively on the physical aspect of reality once he has given the spiritual aspect its due" (352). 
 Here Jung is holding the physical and spiritual to be a coincidence of opposites and is 
arguing that a modern psychology must accommodate both. Coincidence here refers to 
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simultaneity, not to chance or randomness. Two phenomena coincide when they occupy the 
same space, be it logical, imaginative or material space. Jung’s lifelong preoccupation with the 
coincidence of opposites is a preoccupation with trying to understand the simultaneous 
appearance of apparently incompatible phenomena, events or situations. We are reminded here 
of Sells’ (1994) description of apophatic discourse: 
Classical Western apophasis shares three key features: (1) the metaphor of overflowing or 
‘emanation’ which is often in creative tension with the language of intentional, demiurgic 
creation; (2) dis-ontological discursive effort to avoid reifying the transcendent as an 
‘entity’ or ‘being’ or ‘thing’; (3) a distinctive dialectic of transcendence and immanence 
in which the utterly transcendent is revealed as the utterly immanent. (6) 
 
Sells seems to be describing three instances of the coincidence of opposites:  
overflowing/intentional (emanation/creation), dis-ontological/reifying, and 
transcendence/immanence. 
 Jung (1976) cites Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) as his source for the term. He asserts that 
the often “tortuous language” associated with the discussion of the union of opposites “cannot be 
called abstruse since it has universal validity, from the tao of Lao-tzu to the coincidentia 
oppositorum of Cusanus” (166). Along with the infinite disproportion between the finite and the 
infinite, and learned ignorance, the coincidence of opposites is one of the three central doctrines 
of Cusa’s thought. Ideas of the coincidence of opposites predate Cusa, but he is the first to 
develop the concept systematically and to make it a lynchpin of his philosophy and theology. For 
Cusa the coincidence of opposites is a methodology. As Bond (1997) describes it: 
At infinity thoroughgoing coincidence occurs… at true infinity there is one only and all 
are one. The coincidence of opposites provides a method that resolves contradictions 
without violating the integrity of the contrary elements and without diminishing the 
reality or the force of their contradiction. It is not a question of seeing unity where there 
is no real contrariety, nor is it a question of forcing harmony by synthesizing resistant 
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parties. Coincidence as a method issues from coincidence as a fact or condition of 
opposition that is resolved in and by infinity. (22) 
 
 In Cusa’s (1440) On Learned Ignorance the coincidence of opposites is described as one 
type of union of opposites. It is a “unity in convergence, that is, a ‘falling together’… a unity 
geometrically conceived, but without quantity… It is a unity of substance without mingling and 
without obliteration of either party or substance” (Bond 1997, 28). The coincidence of opposites 
is beyond the reach of discursive reasoning. The coincidence of opposites is a “unity to which 
neither otherness nor plurality nor multiplicity is opposed” (Bond 1997, 28). 
 According to Bond (1997), Cusa (1453) describes the coincidence of opposites as the 
wall of paradise, beyond which is God:  
God is beyond the realm of contradictories… there exists an impenetrable barrier to 
human vision and reason… he intends that the reader understand not so much that God is 
the coincidence of opposites, but rather that opposites coincide in God… the notion of 
opposites coinciding requires a transcendent vision – seeing beyond particularity and 
sensibility, a seeing through and beyond the image or symbol, and an antecedent seeing, 
considering problems in their infinitely simple principle prior to contradiction. (46) 
 
The coincidence of opposites is incomprehensible to human rationality. The encounter with the 
incomprehensible has a transforming effect on the identity of the searcher. 
To see coincidence is still not to see God. God, the object of human’s effort to see, 
however, acts on our seeing as subject so that the searcher and observer discovers oneself 
searched out, observed, measured, defined. This is one of the more interesting features of 
Cusa’s treatise – the human as figura, the theologian discovering oneself as symbol; the 
searcher after the meaning behind symbols becomes oneself a symbol. (Bond 1997, 46-7)  
 
The idea that “the searcher after meaning behind symbols becomes oneself a symbol,” resonates 
with Jung’s (1963) observations at the end of Memories, Dreams, Reflections: 
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When Lao-tzu says: “All are clear, I alone am clouded,” he is expressing what I now feel 
in advanced old age… there is so much that fills me: plants, animals, clouds, day and 
night, and the eternal in man. The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the more there 
has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all things. In fact it seems to me as if that 
alienation which so long separated me from the world has become transferred into my 
own inner world, and has revealed to me an unexpected unfamiliarity with myself. (359) 
 
 There are some parallels between Jung’s late reflections and Cusa’s (1464) last work. 
Earlier, in 1460 Cusa had used the term possest to name God. As Bond (1997) explains, it is “a 
play on words, a coincidence of posse (‘can’) and est (‘is’), the Can, the Possibility that at the 
same time Is, the Can-Is, which only God can be” (58). In On the Summit of Contemplation Cusa 
calls God Posse Itself. According to Bond (1997), Cusa is “superseding not only negation and 
affirmation but also the coincidence of opposites” (59). This echoes Dionysius' schema of 
kataphasis, apophasis, ekstasis. Posse Itself is “that without which nothing whatsoever can be, or 
live, or understand… without posse nothing whatsoever can be or can have, can do or can 
undergo… if it were not presupposed, nothing whatever could be… In its power are necessarily 
contained those things that are as well as those that are not” (Cusa 1997, 294-6). Seeing that 
Posse Itself involves neither comprehension nor cognition, Cusa “embraces the negation of 
knowing and at the same time the affirmation of sight” (Bond 1997, 62). The mind’s capacity to 
see Posse Itself lies in its own posse. In this sense the posse of the mind is the image of God, 
Posse Itself: 
This posse of the mind to see beyond all comprehensible faculty and power is the mind’s 
supreme posse. In it Posse Itself manifests itself maximally, and the mind’s supreme 
posse is not brought to its limit this side of Posse Itself. For the posse to see is directed 
only to Posse Itself so that the mind can foresee that toward which it tends, just as a 
traveller foresees one’s journey’s end so that one can direct one’s steps toward the 
desired goal… For Posse Itself, when it will appear in the glory of majesty, is alone able 
to satisfy the mind’s longing. For it is that what which is sought. (Cusa 1997, 297-8) 
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Jung and Cusa share a view that there is a bridge between the human and a greater reality. For 
Jung this bridge is the self and for Cusa it is the posse of the mind. Jung and Cusa are espousing 
a negative anthropology that resonates with that of Marion’s (2005) when he states “only the 
infinite and incomprehensible can comprehend man, and thus tell him of and show him to 
himself” (18). 
Deleuze 
 The uncanny experience of being reminded of Jung when reading Deleuze is expressed 
by Zizek (2004) in characteristically pithy fashion: “No wonder, then, that an admiration of Jung 
is Deleuze’s corpse in the closet; the fact that Deleuze borrowed a key term (rhizome) from Jung 
is not a mere insignificant accident – rather, it points toward a deeper link” (662).1 Hallward 
(2010) observes, “If there is an analogue within the psychoanalytic tradition to Deleuze’s 
conception of the cosmos-brain it is not Lacan’s unconscious, but Jung’s cosmic consciousness” 
(48). 
 Davis (2001) links Deleuze explicitly with the tradition of negative theology, but in 
general little has been made of this kind of connection. It is possible to understand two of 
Deleuze’s key concepts – “Body without Organs” (BwO) and “becoming” – as carriers of 
apophatic intensity. According to de Gaynesford (2001), “the BwO is defined apophatically, in 
relation to that which it is not. The same tendency informs the attempts by various theologians to 
define Christ’s incarnation” (93). 
 The BwO stands in relation to organism. An organism exists as such because its shape 
has been externally imposed by God or another powerful agency. “We come to the gradual 
realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. 
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The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but that organization of the 
organs called the organism” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 176). 
 The BwO shares many characteristics of the collective unconscious. In Land’s (2011) 
words, "The unconscious is not an aspirational unity but an operative swarm, a population of 
preindividual and prepersonal singularities, a pure dispersed and anarchic multiplicity, without 
unity or totality… This absence of primordial or privileged relations is the body without organs" 
(304). We might think of it as an archetypal maelstrom. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) assert that: 
Where psychoanalysis says, “Stop, find your self again,” we should say instead, “Let’s go 
further still, we haven’t found our BwO yet, we haven’t sufficiently dismantled our self.” 
Substitute forgetting for anamnesis, experimentation for interpretation. Find your body 
without organs. Find out how to make it. It’s a question of life and death, youth and old 
age, sadness and joy. It is where everything is played out. (167) 
 
There are some parallels between the dismantling of the organism to uncover or create the 
BwO and the process of analysis. Seem (1984) compared Deleuze’s recommendation to make a 
BwO to Laing’s encouragement to “mankind to take a journey, the journey through ego-loss” 
(xix). Jung (1976) observed that, "The self, in its efforts at self-realization, reaches out beyond 
the ego-personality on all sides; because of its all-encompassing nature it is brighter and darker 
than the ego, and accordingly confronts it with problems which it would like to avoid… For this 
reason the experience of the self is always a defeat for the ego” (545-6). 
 The creation of the BwO is a practice of unknowing which opens the practitioner to more 
unrestricted flows of life. Apophatic discourse can move in the direction of origins or in the 
direction of the future. The emphasis can be on an unknowable beginning or on an unknowable 
destination. The BwO could be seen as an example of a return to an incomprehensible origin. 
Becoming, a key concept in Deleuze’s work, is concerned to create and accomplish an 
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incomprehensible destiny: “Deleuze’s pragmatic and future-oriented epistemology is oriented 
toward the creation of concepts ‘for unknown lands,’ as well as meanings and values ‘that are yet 
to come’” (Smetsky and Delpech-Ramey 2010, 7). 
 The parallels with Jung’s concepts of individuation and the transcendent function are 
immediately evident: 
Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly 
not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-progressing; 
neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; neither is it 
producing, producing a filiation or producing through filiation. Becoming is a verb 
with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, “appearing,” 
“being,” “equaling,” or “producing.”  (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 263) 
 
Here becoming is being defined apophatically, by what it is not. Jung (1958) describes the 
necessity for the analyst to follow the lead of the patient; to not intervene with preconceived 
attitudes and assumptions in the unfolding of the patient’s self-discovery or self-creation, “which 
sometimes drives him into complete isolation… It is, moreover, only in the state of complete 
abandonment and loneliness that we experience the helpful powers of our own natures” (342).  
The patient is compelled to pursue a perilous course of action: 
And though this desire opens the door to the most dangerous possibilities, we cannot help 
seeing it as a courageous enterprise and giving it some measure of sympathy. It is no 
reckless adventure, but an effort inspired by deep spiritual distress to bring meaning once 
more into life on the basis of fresh and unprejudiced experience. Caution has its place, no 
doubt, but we cannot refuse our support to a serious venture which challenges the whole of 
the personality. If we oppose it, we are trying to suppress what is best in man – his daring 
and his aspirations. And should we succeed, we should only have stood in the way of that 
invaluable experience which might have given a meaning to life. (Jung 1958, 342) 
 
Deleuze (1995) echoes Jung’s call to experience: 
… one steps outside what’s been thought before, once one ventures outside what’s familiar 
and reassuring, once one has to invent new concepts for unknown lands, then methods and 
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moral systems break down and thinking becomes… a “perilous act,” a violence, whose 
first victim is oneself… Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting… and what we 
experience, experiment with, is… what’s coming into being, what’s new, what’s taking 
shape. (103-4) 
 
The transcendent function, which might be characterised as an apophatic method at the heart 
of Jung’s work, like becoming, occurs in the between. It is not a repetition but a becoming-other 
than oneself. The transcendent function produces difference. Differentiation is the engine of 
individuation: 
The subject-in-process, that is, as becoming, is always placed between two multiplicities, 
yet one term does not become the other; the becoming is something between the two, this 
something called by Deleuze a pure affect. Therefore becoming does not mean becoming 
the other, but becoming-other… The non-place-in-between acts as a gap, or differentiator, 
introducing an element of discontinuity in the otherwise continuous process of becoming 
and allowing the difference to actively intervene. (Semetsky 2006, 6) 
 
The BwO and becoming operate as sites of apophasis within the work of Deleuze, who might be 
read as the philosopher for Jung's analytical psychology.  
Derrida 
 In his essay, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,’ Derrida (1992) uses the theme of ‘place’ 
to organize his thoughts: “Figuration and the so-called places (topoi) of rhetoric constitute the 
very concern of apophatic procedures” (97). He does not present these as steps in a dialectic, 
because “we are involved in a thinking that is essentially alien to dialectic,” (100) but as 
“paradigms” or “signs.” He describes these paradigms in architectural terms as a mode that “will 
surround a resonant space of which nothing, almost nothing, will ever be said” (100). Jung’s 
theory is often described in terms of architectonics. The theme of place has echoes of Jung’s 
(1981d) discussion of mandalas. The mandala defines a space – psychic, imaginal, ritual – that 
provides an orientation toward an ultimately unknowable content: "All that can be ascertained at 
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present about the symbolism of the mandala is that it portrays an autonomous psychic fact… It 
seems to be a sort of atomic nucleus about whose innermost structure and ultimate meaning we 
know nothing" (183). 
 Derrida (1992) observes that the apophasis of Dionysius begins with prayer. Prayer 
functions as an orientation toward the unknown. The prayer at the beginning of the Mystical 
Theology is addressed simultaneously to God, to Dionysius’ disciple Timothy and to the reader: 
 
The identity of this place, and hence of this text, and of its reader, comes from the future of 
what is promised by the promise… the apophasis is brought into motion – it is initiated, in 
the sense of initiative and initiation – by the event of a revelation which is also a promise… 
the place that is thus revealed remains the place of waiting, awaiting the realization of the 
promise. Then it will take place fully. It will be fully a place. (Derrida 1992, 117-8) 
 
This sense of the revelation that is full of promise can be seen in Jung’s attitude toward psychic 
phenomena. The symbol contains promise of an as yet undisclosed meaning. Jung insisted on the 
importance of maintaining an open and expectant attitude toward the unconscious – waiting on 
the images. His texts can be read as addressed simultaneously to the unconscious and to the 
reader with an expectation of an unknown future. 
Jung (1981b) recommends a similar attitude of alertness to the unknown in the case of dreams 
and of individuation. He reminds himself when he hears a dream, “I have no idea what this 
dream means” (283). "Even if one has great experience in these matters, one is again and again 
obliged, before each dream, to admit one’s ignorance and renouncing all preconceived ideas, to 
prepare for something entirely unexpected" (287). The analyst by accepting his own ignorance is 
willing to be moved or illuminated by the dream. The dream provides perspective on the 
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personal unconscious and life circumstances, but because personal complexes have roots in 
archetypal images, dreams are also windows into the collective unconscious.  
In analysis Jung (1981c) finds that with some people there comes a time when they have 
exhausted an exploration of material that is dominated by repetition or family dynamics and the 
patient is challenged to discover their own individuality in a more radical way. In this situation 
the analyst must adopt a stance of absolute openness in relation to the patient’s individuation:   
A collective attitude enables the individual to fit into society without friction… But the 
patient’s difficulty consists precisely in the fact that his individual problem cannot be fitted 
without friction into a collective norm; it requires a solution of an individual conflict if the 
whole of his personality is to remain viable. No rational solution can do justice to this task, 
and there is absolutely no collective norm that could replace an individual solution without 
loss. (Jung 1981c, 72-3) 
 
Derrida’s (1995) goal is to penetrate the impossible, rather than pointless repetition of a 
program. "Going where it is possible to go would not be a displacement or a decision, it would 
be the irresponsible unfolding of a program. The sole decision possible passes through the 
madness of the undecidable and the impossible: to go where it is impossible to go" (59). 
The analytic space is a space set apart. The entrance and exit from the space receives a great 
deal of attention in psychoanalytic technique, as the integrity of the frame of analysis is 
considered vital in creating the possibility for the kind of openness that Jung is describing. 
Derrida (1992) asserts that in the work of Dionysius, “It is necessary to stand or step aside, to 
find the place proper to the experience of the secret” (89). He suggests that the practitioners of 
both deconstruction and negative theology appear suspect to outsiders because they seem to 
belong to secret societies: “'Negative theologies' and everything that resembles a form of esoteric 
sociality have always been infortuitously associated with phenomena of secret society, as if 
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access to the most rigorous apophatic discourse demanded the sharing of a ‘secret’… It is as if 
divulgence imperilled a revelation promised to apophasis" (88). The stain of the secret, real or 
imagined, casts its aura over the analytic relationship and analytic institutions. The seal of 
confidentiality breeds both confidence and suspicion. In alchemy, as Jung (1981d) observes, 
“The substance that harbours the divine secret is everywhere, including the human body” (313). 
According to Rayment-Pickard (2003), “Derrida argues that discourses of negation are always 
also affirmative, either echoing or presupposing the positivities they seek to describe by denials” 
(127). When he writes about the trace, it is possible to hear echoes with a possible interpretation 
of Jung’s concept of archetype. “The most negative discourse, even beyond all nihilisms and 
negative dialectics, preserves the trace: The trace of an event older than it or of a ‘taking-place’ 
to come, the one and the other: there is here neither an alternative nor a contradiction” (Derrida 
1992, 97). We could read this as a suggestion that one aspect of the apophatic dynamic at play 
between the ego and the archetype is that for the ego the archetype can represent simultaneously 
a trace of a primordial event and a trace of an unknown future. This is one way in which the 
archetype acts as a coincidence of opposites. 
Bradley (2004) describes Derrida’s method as a questioning of binary oppositions:  
The binary differences that constitute Western metaphysics are shown to be preceded by a 
third position that belongs to neither and that allows those differences to appear as 
oppositional. This unthought space between the transcendental and the empirical is the aporia 
that – however impossibly – deconstruction attempts to think. (24)  
 
This “unthought space” is the ground on which deconstruction meets the discourse of negative 
theology. This potential space between the transcendental and the empirical was also the space 
that Jung was exploring. His description of the work of the alchemists serves as a description of 
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his own work. In it we can hear echoes of Derrida’s (1992) discussion of negative theology, “It 
situates itself beyond all position” (91): 
The imaginatio, as the alchemists understand it, is in truth a key that opens the door to the 
secret of the opus… The place or the medium of realization in neither mind nor matter, but 
that intermediate realm of subtle reality which can be adequately only expressed by the 
symbol. The symbol is neither abstract nor concrete, neither rational nor irrational, neither 
real nor unreal. It is always both. (Jung 1981d, 282-3) 
 
Derrida and Jung are making and unmaking language in order to think about and imagine the 
space of individuation. 
Conclusion 
 Psychoanalytic theory and practice are sites of apophatic theory and discourse. Jung's 
depth psychology is saturated with apophasis. The learned ignorance of the psychoanalyst, 
which is perfected and deepened over time, opens a space for the client to dwell in his or her 
subjectivity. The precarious unknowing of the analyst facilitates the emergence of the client's 
singularity, which paradoxically is their point of union with the infinite.  
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